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ABSTRACT 
 
Following the recent Imperial sugar dust explosion in 2008, a comprehensive 
survey of past dust explosions was conducted by the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) to determine potential explosible dusts. After the survey, OSHA 
personnel listed dust found in cotton gins, or gin dust, fueled two explosions in the past. 
OSHA is required by law to regulate facilities handling explosible dusts to provide a safe 
working environment for employees. The dust handling facilities must test the dust for 
explosibility based on the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) E 1226 
to ensure proper regulation of facilities. 
Dusts found in cotton gins were tested to determine if they are explosible. Safety 
Consulting Engineers Inc. (SCE) personnel tested gin dust in accordance with the ASTM 
method and reported that gin dust (GD) was an explosible dust. However, personnel 
from the Center for Agricultural Air Quality Engineering and Science (CAAQES) 
utilized the CAAQES test method and reported that gin dust was non-explosible. The 
goal of this research was to analyze the two different test methods and determine if gin 
dust should be regulated as an explosible dust. It is assumed that either the ASTM or 
CAAQES test method had incorrectly classified gin dust. The CAAQES test method was 
analyzed and tests were conducted on multiple dusts to the accuracy of the test 
procedure. A theoretical analysis of the ASTM test method was conducted to determine 
potential flaws in the test method. 
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The ASTM test method was found to be flawed. It used pressure as the only 
criterion for a dust explosion, utilized high energy ignition sources, limited the amount 
of oxygen, and had no requirement for a dust to have a minimum explosible 
concentration (MEC) to be classified as explosible. Utilizing high energy ignition source 
can result in a determination that a dust explosion occurred when the measured reaction 
was actually due to the ignition source and not a dust explosion. This type of test is 
referred to as an overdriven test. The CAAQES test method utilizes three criteria: a 
ruptured diaphragm, flame front leaving the chamber, and a characteristic pressure 
versus time curve to determine if a dust has a MEC. If a dust has a MEC, it is an 
explosible dust. By determining the MEC a more accurate classification of a dust can be 
made by utilizing the CAAQES test method, as CAAQES personnel did to determine 
that gin dust is not an explosible dust. An analysis of the ASTM and CAAQES 
explosible dust testing protocols was conducted to determine proper classification of gin 
dust.  
Primary dust explosions occur in the process stream of facilities at locations 
where an explosible dust is entrained at concentrations above the MEC. A primary dust 
explosion may result in a series of secondary dust explosions. For a dust explosion to 
occur four criteria must be met simultaneously: there must be containment, a dust 
entrained in the air at or above the MEC, oxygen must be present, and there must be an 
ignition source. A theoretical analysis was conducted to determine if a MEC exists in a 
cotton gin. The results indicated that there were no locations in a cotton gin where a 
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MEC existed. It was concluded that gin dust is not an explosible dust and that dust 
explosions are not possible in cotton gins. 
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NOMENCLATURE 
 
1.2-L 1.2 Liter Vertical Tube Apparatus 
20-L 20 Liter Spherical Chamber Utilized in ASTM Testing 
28.3-L 28.3 Liter Cubic Chamber Utilized in CAAQES Testing 
ρ Density 
Δu Change in Internal Energy 
ΔT Change in Temperature 
 Efficiency of Cyclone 
µm Micrometers 
AED Aerodynamic Equivalent Diameter 
ASTM American Society for Testing Materials 
atm Atmospheres 
bph Bales per Hour 
C Carbon 
CAAQES Center for Agricultural Air Quality Engineering and Science 
cfm Cubic Feet per Minute 
CI Confidence Interval 
CO2 Carbon Dioxide 
Conc Concentration 
Cv Specific Heat at Constant Volume 
deg K Degrees Kelvin 
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dP/dt Rate of Pressure Rise 
EF Emission Factor 
ft
3
 Cubic Feet 
g Grams 
g fine dust / m
3
 air Grams of Fine Dust per Cubic Meter of Air 
g conveyed / m
3
air Grams Conveyed per Cubic Meter of Air 
g trash / m
3
air Grams of Trash per Cubic Meter of Air 
GD Gin Dust 
GR Ginning Rate in Bales per Hour 
GSD Geometric Standard Deviation 
hr Hour 
J Joule 
Kst Deflagration Index 
kJ Kilo Joules 
L Liters 
lbs Pounds 
Mi Mass Flow Rate  
m
3
 Cubic Meters 
mass air Mass of Air 
mass PM Mass of Particulate Matter 
MEC Minimum Explosive Concentration 
min Minutes 
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MFR Mass Flow Rate 
MMD Mass Median Diameter 
mol Moles 
MW Molecular Weight 
N2 Nitrogen 
NEP National Emphasis Program 
O2 Oxygen 
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
P Pressure 
Pex Maximum Explosive Pressure 
PM Particulate Matter 
PSD Particle Size Distribution 
R Gas Constant 
s Seconds 
SCE Safety Consulting Engineers Inc. 
T Temperature 
VRF Variable Rate of Flow 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The sugar dust explosion in Georgia on February 7, 2008 killed 14 workers and 
injured many others (OSHA, 2009). As a consequence of this dust explosion, the 
Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) revised its Explosible Dust 
National Emphasis Program (NEP). An explosible dust expert forum in May 2011 
reported that facilities handling suspected explosible dusts must test their dusts and 
perform risk assessments of explosible dust hazards. If a dust is determined to be 
explosible, OSHA is required to regulate all facilities handling that dust to prevent dust 
explosions. To determine possible explosible dusts, OSHA conducted a comprehensive 
survey of reported dust explosions and fires in the past. Based on this survey, OSHA 
personnel reported that dust found in cotton gins may have caused dust explosions on 
two separate incidences. However, the reports that cotton gins had experienced dust 
explosions were not supported by documented investigations. There are significant 
differences between fires and dust explosions. Cotton gins periodically have fires, but 
these fires are not dust explosions. It is assumed that the two reported incidences were 
the result of fire marshals incorrectly labeled gin dust as fueling a dust explosion. 
In the literature, a dust explosion is more accurately a “deflagration” in contrast 
to another type of explosion, a detonation. A deflagration differs greatly from a 
detonation and consists of a dust cloud being ignited with the resulting pressures causing 
significant damage. Typically, a primary deflagration is followed by multiple secondary 
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deflagrations. In contrast, a detonation is initiated by a detonator that creates a pressure 
wave that serves as the igniter of the explosive. A detonation is fueled by materials such 
as dynamite or ammonium nitrate in contrast to the dust entrained in the air that serves 
as the fuel for a detonation. In a detonation, the flame speed and the pressure wave travel 
at a speed equal to or greater than the speed of sound (330 meters per second). In a 
deflagration, the pressure wave moves away from the source at a speed equal to or less 
than the speed of sound, while the flame front follows at approximately 1 to 10 meters 
per second (Palmer, 1973).  
An explosible dust is a dust with a MEC. A MEC is the minimum concentration 
of dust entrained in air that will result in a self-propagating flame through the dust cloud. 
Palmer (1973) defines a Group „A‟ explosible dust as one that propagates a flame in the 
test apparatus when ignited by a small energy source (10 J) in contrast to Group „B‟ 
dusts which do not self-propagate a flame in the test apparatus. Palmer (1973) noted that 
not all dusts with volatiles are explosible. The only way to properly determine if a dust is 
explosible is to testing it for a MEC. If there is a concentration of a dust that results in a 
self-propagating flame through the dust cloud when ignited, the dust is explosible. 
Dust explosions occur in series. The first explosion, referred to as the primary 
dust explosion, occurs in a small volume, such as the boot of a leg in a grain elevator. A 
pressure rise occurs when the dust is converted to gas as the flame self-propagates 
through the dust cloud. Primary dust explosions are relatively small, contrasting to a 
secondary dust explosion, with a maximum pressure of less than 0.1 bar gauge. The 
pressure ruptures the initial containment, resulting in a pressure wave and flame front 
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moving into a larger secondary containment volume. Unburned dust in the primary 
explosion may also be conveyed by the pressure wave to the secondary volume and 
serve as fuel for a secondary deflagration (Lesikar et al., 1991). The fire front follows 
the pressure wave and, if there is a MEC, serves as the ignition source for the secondary 
explosion in the larger volume. Secondary dust explosions may result in maximum 
pressures of over 7 bar gauge (100 psi gauge) and cause extensive damage to facilities 
(Palmer, 1973; Parnell, 1980; Lesikar et al., 1991; Parnell, 1993). All dust explosions 
subsequent to the primary are referred to as secondary explosions, with multiple 
secondary explosions common in dust explosions events. 
Deflagrations pose serious safety risks for grain handling facilities. Not only 
must facilities comply with numerous OSHA rules and standards designed to provide 
safe working conditions for employees, but the high occurrence of dust explosions 
demonstrates that the risk is still present. On October 29, 2011, a grain dust explosion in 
a Kansas grain elevator killed six and injured two more. In the ensuing OSHA 
investigation, the grain elevator was fined in excess of $400,000 dollars for twelve 
violations after not having been cited for any violations in the eight years leading up to 
the dust explosion (OSHA, 2013). The lack of OSHA violations prior to the deflagration 
illustrates the difficulty of preventing dust explosions in grain handling facilities as well 
as the limited effectiveness of OSHA regulations. 
The concentrations of dust present in a facility can be determined by conducting 
an analysis of the process stream. Primary dust explosions can occur in locations that 
dust concentrations are at or above the MEC, such as grain transfer points in grain 
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elevators. Palmer (1973) lists the MEC of cornstarch as 40 g/m
3
, which is typical of 
many agricultural dusts. Preventing dust explosions in grain handling facilities can be 
achieved by engineering ventilation systems to reduce the concentrations at grain 
transfer points to less than the MECs (NFPA 68, 2007; NMAB 367-2, 1982; NMAB 
367-3, 1982; NMAB 367-4, 1983). 
As a consequence of the reported explosions in cotton gins from the survey, tests 
were conducted to determine if cotton gin dust (GD) was explosible. Explosibility tests 
were performed by CAAQES and SCE personnel. CAAQES and SCE personnel used 
different test methods to determine if GD was explosible. The results of the explosibility 
tests conducted by SCE were that GD was a Class „A‟ explosible dust while the 
CAAQES test results determined that GD was non-explosible. The difference in results 
from SCE and CAAQES prompted a CAAQES study, and Parnell et al. (2012) reported 
that the ASTM test method used by SCE was flawed.  
SCE conducted tests in an enclosed spherical 20-liter (L) chamber with 
pyrotechnic chemical igniters with 5 and 10 kJ of ignition energy. The only criterion 
used to indicate a deflagration in the 20-L chamber was pressure. If the pressure rise 
inside the 20-L chamber exceeded one bar gauge, then it was assumed that a deflagration 
had occurred. In contrast, the CAAQES testing system utilizes a 28.3-L cubic chamber 
with a stationary ignition source, a diaphragm and three different criteria to indicate a 
deflagration.  
Cashdollar, K.L and K. Chatrathi (1992) describe a situation in laboratory testing 
when the igniter flame is too large relative to the volume of the chamber as an 
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overdriven test. When overdriven, a test could appear to result in an explosion, while it 
is actually just dust burning in the igniter flame with no real propagation beyond the 
igniter. The ASTM response to overdriven results is to test the dust in a one cubic meter 
chamber. 
In order for a deflagration to occur, the flame must self-propagate through the 
dust cloud. If a moving, 10,000 J igniter flame is forced through the dust cloud to the 
opposite side of the chamber, it is likely that the dust will be classified as explosible if 
any volatiles are present (Parnell et al., 2012). Parnell et al. (2012) illustrated that only 
5.5 grams of oxygen are contained in the 20-L chamber and a stoichiometric combustion 
of 2 grams of dust will consume all the oxygen in the chamber. The tests performed by 
SCE personnel where they concluded that GD was explosible used a 10,000 J igniter 
flame forced through the chamber containing 20 grams or 1,000 g/m
3
. 
The CAAQES method utilized the following equipment and procedures: (1) 
testing the dust in a 28.3-L, cubic chamber with a diaphragm that bursts at 
approximately 0.1 bars; (2) a stationary coil ignition source; (3) a video camera used to 
capture the deflagration frame by frame; and (4) pressure recordings. Using this method, 
a dust was determined to be explosible if it had a MEC. The protocol required three 
replications of a concentration above the MEC and reducing the concentration until no 
explosion occurred. In the CAAQES method, the following three criteria were used for 
determining whether a deflagration had occurred: (1) the diaphragm was ruptured: (2) 
the flame front exited the chamber; and (3) a characteristic pressure versus time curve 
was obtained. 
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 Objectives 
 
To characterize GD and make a determination on the potential for dust 
explosions in a cotton gin, the following objectives were established: 
1. Analyze the ASTM and CAAQES explosibility testing procedures and 
protocols. 
2. Determine if a MEC can occur in a cotton gin. 
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CHAPTER II  
ANALYZE THE ASTM AND CAAQES EXPLOSIBLE DUST TESTING 
PROTOCOLS
*
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In December 2009, the National Cotton Ginners Association made a request to 
the CAAQES to conduct explosibility tests on dust found in cotton gins to determine 
whether it is explosible. In January 2010, the director of CAAQES reported that GD is 
not an explosible dust. However, in June 2010, SCE personnel reported that GD is 
explosible according to the ASTM testing method. 
The dust characteristics that may affect the MEC include particle size, particle 
density, energy content and percent volatile material. However, the correlation between 
these characteristics and dust explosibility is not defined well enough to determine if a 
dust is explosible without testing a dust for its explosibility. The only way to determine 
if a dust is explosible is to test for a MEC. If there is a concentration of a dust at which a 
flame will self-propagate, then there is a MEC and the dust is classified as explosible. 
                                                 
*
 Reprinted from Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Vol. 26, Issue 3, 
C. B. Parnell, R. O. McGee, B. Ganesan, F. J. Vanderlick, S. E. Hughs, K. Green, A 
Critical Evaluation of Combustible/Explosible Dust Testing Methods – Part I, Pages 
427-433, Copyright 2013, with permission from Elsevier 
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CAAQES personnel utilized the CAAQES method to test GD as described by 
Parnell et al. (2012). Dust explosion testing in accordance with the CAAQES test 
method requires the use of a 28.3-L (1ft
3
) cubic chamber with a diaphragm and a 
stationary heated coil ignition source, as shown in figure 1. The chamber is constructed 
of Plexiglas© which allows for visual confirmation of a dust explosion and an accurate 
determination of the volume of the chamber occupied by the dust cloud, which affects 
the concentration of dust being tested. A pressure sensor is fitted in the chamber to 
record the change in pressure during each trial. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Front view of 28.3-L chamber used in CAAQES testing. 
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Using the CAAQES method, a dust is found to be an explosible dust if a MEC 
exists. In the CAAQAES method, a deflagration had occurred if the diaphragm ruptures, 
the flame front leaves the chamber, and a characteristic pressure versus time curve is 
obtained. Each test was recorded and the video was analyzed to determine if the flame 
front exited the chamber.  
The pressure versus time curve for a deflagration of cornstarch at 56 g/m
3
 is 
shown in figure 2. The pressure rises as the dust cloud was ignited by the stationary coil 
resulting in a self-propagating flame through the dust cloud. Sequentially, the diaphragm 
ruptured at approximately 0.1 bar gauge, releasing the pressure and flame front, creating 
a vacuum inside the chamber. Ambient air then entered the chamber, returning it to 
atmospheric pressure. A pressure versus time curve displaying these traits is referred to 
as a characteristic pressure versus time curve in the CAAQES test method. 
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Figure 2. Characteristic pressure versus time curve obtained in CAAQES testing. 
 
 
CAAQES personnel tested gin dust at concentrations ranging from 100 to 1,000 
g/m
3
 and no deflagrations were observed. The diaphragm remained intact, and the 
characteristic pressure versus time curve was not obtained in any of the 30 trials 
conducted, compelling CAAQES personnel to report that GD is not explosible to the 
National Cotton Ginners Association. 
SCE tested GD utilizing the ASTM test method E1226-05 standard for testing 
explosible dusts. Dust explosion testing in accordance with the ASTM standards requires 
the use of a totally enclosed 20-L spherical metal chamber. 2.5, 5, or 10 kJ pyrotechnic 
igniters are fired through the dust cloud and across the chamber. It is assumed the dust 
cloud is uniformly distributed in the volume of the spherical chamber. Pressure rise is 
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the only criterion used to determine if a deflagration occurred in the ASTM test method. 
If the pressure rise exceeds 1 bar, the dust is classified as explosible. Palmer (1973) used 
10 J as the ignition energy for dust explosibility testing. The ASTM test method uses 
relatively high ignition energies of up to 10 kJ to ensure that sufficient energy is 
provided for proper classification of “hard to ignite” dusts.  Any volatile material that is 
contacted by the moving chemical flame would combust, increasing the pressure inside 
the chamber without self-propagation of a flame. Cashdollar (2000) described the 
situation in which the combustion of volatiles in the chamber was due to the moving 
high energy ignition source, rather than the self-propagation of the flame, as an 
overdriven test.  
ASTM E1226-05 is the Standard Test Method for Pressure and Rate of Pressure 
Rise for Combustible Dust, and it is the standard method used to determine the explosive 
characteristics of a dust, including the deflagration index (Kst), maximum explosive 
pressure (Pex), and rate of pressure rise (dP/dt). The explosive characteristics of the dust 
are used to determine the preventive and control measures needed by facilities handling 
the dust, such as the design of explosion venting. Testing in accordance with ASTM 
standard E1226-05 relies only on pressure rise and does not require that the MEC of a 
dust be determined for explosive classification. 
ASTM E1515-07 is the Standard Test method for Minimum Explosible 
Concentration of Combustible Dusts. Use of 2.5 or 5 kJ pyrotechnic igniters is 
recommended in the 20-L spherical chamber for MEC testing. Deflagration is defined in 
ASTM E1515-07 as a rise in pressure of 1 bar gauge over the pressure rise of the igniter. 
 12 
 
However, a warning in E1515-07 states that if a dust ignites with a 5 kJ igniter but not 
with a 2.5 kJ igniter then the system may be overdriven. 
 
Methodology 
 
CAAQES Test Method 
The particle size and ash analysis for GD was determined and compared with 
explosible dusts, cornstarch and dust XX. Dust XX is a manufactured dust, from an 
undisclosed source, that consists of clay surrounded by animal fat.  
The ash analysis was conducted to determine the percent of non-volatile material 
in a dust sample. The protocol consisted of pre-weighing three samples of each dust and 
post-weighing following four hours in a furnace at 300 degrees Celsius (575º F). 
Increased fractions of inert dust will either increase the MEC or prevent the flame from 
propagating through the dust cloud (Palmer, 1973). The results of the ash analysis are 
shown in table 1. GD was found to have the highest ash content with 87 percent while 
only 13 percent of GD was combustible. 
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Table 1. Results of ash analysis performed on test dusts. 
Dust Type Ash% ± 95% CI 
Cornstarch 0.98 ± 0.02 
Dust XX 61.6 ± 0.01 
Gin Dust 87.2 ± 1.13 
 
The particle size distributions (PSD) were performed using the coulter counter 
Multisizer in the BAEN department at Texas A&M University and the results are shown 
in table 2. Dust samples typically have a lognormal distribution and are defined by mass 
median diameters (MMD) and geometric standard deviation (GSD) (Cooper and Alley, 
2002). 
 
 
Table 2. Results of particle size analysis performed on test dusts. 
Dust Type MMD ± 95% CI GSD ± 95% CI 
Cornstarch 15.5 ± 0.29 1.6 ± 0.08 
Dust XX 13.7 ± 0.06 2.1 ± 0.03 
Gin Dust 23.7 ± 0.88 1.9 ± 0.01 
 
 
Explosible dust tests were conducted on cornstarch and Dust XX utilizing the 
CAAQES test method for a comparison to GD. Three trials were conducted at each 
concentration until no deflagrations occurred. The MEC for cornstarch was determined 
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to be 43 g/m
3
, which is similar to the 40 g/m
3
 published by Palmer (1973), and at 43 
g/m
3
, one of the three trials, CS 43_3, resulted in a deflagration. The MEC for Dust XX 
was determined to be 73 g/m
3
. The pressure versus time curves for cornstarch at 43 g/m
3
 
is shown in figure 3. A dust cloud of cornstarch at 43 g/m
3
 contacting the stationary 
ignition source is shown in figure 4.Subsequently, the resulting diaphragm rupture and 
the flame front leaving the chamber, signifying a dust explosion occurred, is shown in 
figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 3. Pressure versus time graph for cornstarch at 43 g/m
3
. Only one dust 
explosion was observed (CS 43_3). 
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Figure 4. Cornstarch at 43 g/m
3
 contacting stationary ignition source. 
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Figure 5. Ruptured diaphragm and flame front leaving chamber, signifying a dust 
explosion for cornstarch at 43 g/m
3
. 
 
 
GD was tested at concentrations from 100 to 1,000 g/m
3
, utilizing the CAAQES 
test method, with three trials conducted at each concentration and no dust explosions 
 17 
 
were detected. Flames were detected when the GD contacted the stationary ignition 
source. However, no self-propagation of a flame was observed. The diaphragm was not 
ruptured and no characteristic pressure versus time curve was obtained. The pressure 
versus time curve for GD at 1000 g/m
3
, which is typical for all concentrations of GD, is 
shown in figure 6. The flat lines demonstrated that no dust explosions were observed in 
the CAAQES chamber.  
A review of the video recordings taken of the tests of GD showed that no dust 
explosions occurred. GD igniting as it contacts the stationary ignition source is shown in 
figure 7 and the presence of the flame demonstrates that the energy of the igniter is 
greater than the ignition energy of gin dust. The flame continued to burn as GD 
contacted the stationary ignition source. However, no self-propagation of a flame was 
detected, as shown in figure 8. 
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Figure 6. Pressure versus time curves for GD at 1,000 g/m
3
. No dust explosions 
were detected. 
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Figure 7. Gin dust at 1,000 g/m
3
 igniting as it contacts the stationary ignition 
source. 
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Figure 8. No self-propagation of flame from stationary ignition source for gin dust 
at 1,000 g/m
3
. The intact diaphragm and lack of flame exiting the chamber 
demonstrates that a dust explosion did not occur. 
 
 
ASTM Test Method 
A portion of the sample of GD was sent to SCE to test it for explosibility based 
on the ASTM E1226-05 standard for explosible dust testing in spring 2010. SCE 
personnel conducted a screening test described by Bartknecht (1989) utilizing the 1.2-L 
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Vertical Tube Apparatus (SCE, 2010). The weighed sample was dispersed in the 
chamber with a blast of compressed air. A dust was classified as explosible if a flame 
was observed self-propagating away from the 10 J continuous arc ignition source.  
Samples of gin dust from 0.25 to 20.0 grams (g) were tested with ten trials at 
each of the eleven different concentrations. It should be noted that 0.25 and 20.0 g is 
equivalent to approximately 210 and 17,000 g/m
3
 respectfully, assuming uniform 
dispersion in a 1.2-L test chamber. No flame propagation was observed in the 110 trials 
conducted. 
Since no flames were detected, SCE continued testing in a 20-L spherical 
chamber recommended by the ASTM standard. The dust was classified explosible if the 
maximum pressure was greater than or equal to 0.4 bar. SCE did not report why they 
used 0.4 bar as an explosion indicator. A 10 kJ ignition source was used to test GD at a 
concentration of 1,000 g/m
3
, and reported a maximum pressure of 5.6 bars. SCE 
concluded that gin dust was a combustible dust and continued with testing the explosive 
characteristics using ASTM E1226-05. Gin dust was tested in 15 trials with 
concentrations ranging from 125 to 3000 g/m
3
 with a 10 kJ ignition source. SCE 
reported the characteristics of gin dust as: Pex of 5.5 bars, dP/dt of 97 bar/s and Kst of 26 
m*bar/s. 
Once GD was classified as class „A‟ explosible by SCE, at the request from 
CAAQES personnel, SCE continued with MEC testing. SCE noted in their report that 
testing for MEC can be determined using ASTM E1515-07. From SCE‟s description of 
the method used it appears that SCE used the ASTM E1515-07 method. The 20-L 
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spherical chamber was used with a 5 kJ ignition source and an explosion pressure of 0.5 
bars or greater was used to determine if a deflagration had occurred. SCE did not state 
how the 0.5 bars criterion was determined or why it differed from the 0.4 bars used in 
the explosibility classification test. Seven trials were conducted at concentrations 
ranging from 100 to 400 g/m
3
. SCE reported the MEC for GD as 300-350 g/m
3
. 
 
Theoretical Analysis of 20-L Chamber 
The pressure rise recorded in the ASTM tests can be approximated using a 
simple adiabatic reaction of carbon being consumed by a thermal reaction using the ideal 
gas law and the constant-volume sensible heat equation. The following simple reaction is 
hypothesized as the reaction of burning carbon representing the combustible dust in a 
20-L chamber: 
 
2222 76.376.3 NCONOC       (1) 
where, C – Carbon (moles) 
 O2 – Oxygen (moles) 
 N2 – Nitrogen (moles) 
 CO2 – Carbon dioxide (moles) 
 
One mole of carbon (Molecular Weight (MW) =12) reacts with one mole of 
oxygen (MW=32) with the requisite 3.76 moles of nitrogen (MW=28) that accompanies 
the air. This thermal reaction produces one mole of CO2 (MW 44). Equations 2 and 3 
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illustrate the calculations of molecular weight before and after the reaction. The 
molecular weight of the gas prior to the reaction consisting of one mole of oxygen and 
3.76 moles of nitrogen at standard temperature and pressure is 28.8 grams per mole. The 
MW after the reaction consisting of one mole of carbon dioxide and 3.76 moles of 
nitrogen is 31.4 grams per mole. 
 
8.28
76.4
28*76.332


beforeMW      (2) 
where, MWbefore – Molecular Weight, before reaction (g/mole) 
  
4.31
76.4
28*76.344


afterMW      (3) 
where, MWafter – Molecular Weight, after reaction (g/mole) 
  
Equation 4 is the equation for gas density derived from the ideal gas law. The 
density of the gases prior to the thermal reaction is 1.19 grams per liter. The density of 
gases after the reaction is a function of the temperature and pressure.  
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*
*



TR
MWP
     (4) 
where, ρ – Density of Gasses (g/L) 
 P – Pressure (atm) 
 MW – Molecular Weight (g/mole) 
 R – Gas Constant (L*atm/deg K*moles) 
 T – Temperature (deg K) 
 
 The mass of air in a 20-L chamber is 23.8 g (1.19 g/L * 20L) prior to the reaction 
and 24.8 g after the reaction, assuming complete combustion of one gram of carbon. The 
20-L chamber contains 5.5 g of O2 and 18.3 g of N2 prior to the reaction; after the 
reaction, the MW of the CO2 and 3.76 moles of N2 is 31.4 grams per mole. One gram of 
carbon (0.0833 moles) will consume 2.67 g of O2 (0.0833 moles) in a stoichiometric 
reaction. For this scenario, the oxygen will be completely consumed by 2 g of carbon.  
The specific heat at constant volume (Cv) is defined as the ratio of the change in 
internal energy (Δu) per unit mass required to increase gas temperature by one degree 
Kelvin (ΔT). 
 
T
u
Cv


         (5) 
where, Cv – Specific Heat at Constant Volume (J/g*deg K) 
 Δu – Change in Internal Energy (J/g) 
 ΔT – Change in Temperature (deg K) 
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The Cv of the gases produced was used to determine the temperature rise. The 
weighted average of Cv was assumed to be 0.95 J/(g-deg K), based on the mass fraction 
of CO2 and N2 after the reaction. 
The estimated internal energy content of one gram of combustible dust from an 
agricultural source is 16 kJ/g. SCE was required to test, according to the ASTM test 
method, at 1,000 g/m
3
, with an ignition flame from a 10 kJ energy source before gin dust 
could be classified as non-explosible. The total energy in the chamber would be 26 kJ. 
The energy per unit mass (Δu) would be equal to 1050 Joules per gram or 26 kJ divided 
by 24.8 grams. The temperature rise, using equation 5, would be 1050/0.95=1100 
degrees Kelvin, and the absolute temperature would be 1400 degrees Kelvin. Using the 
ideal gas law, the absolute pressure due to this rise in temperature would be 4.5 bars or a 
pressure rise of 3.5 bars gauge. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
The three criteria utilized when testing in accordance with the CAAQES test 
method more accurately classify a dust as explosible over the ASTM method. The 
rupture of the diaphragm indicates that a pressure rise occurred. Video recordings can be 
utilized to show the flame self-propagated through the dust cloud and the flame front 
exiting the chamber. The characteristic pressure versus time curve allows the reaction in 
the chamber to be compared to a characteristic dust explosion, while the presence of a 
flame in the testing demonstrates that GD is not a “hard to ignite” dust. A dust sample 
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must have a MEC for the dust to be classified as an explosible dust, when utilizing the 
CAAQES test method. 
The results of calculating the theoretical pressure rise due to 2.5, 5 and 10 kJ 
ignition sources, assuming no heat is lost to the walls of the chamber, is shown in table 
3. The resulting pressure rise due to 2.5, 5 and 10 kJ igniter in the 20-L chamber was 0.4, 
0.7, and 1.4 bar gauge, respectfully. ASTM E1515-07 suggests the effects should be 
established for each size of igniter in order to correct for the difference in pressure rise 
due to the igniter. The calculated pressure rise from 1 gram of agricultural dust being 
combusted in the 20-L chamber is also shown in table 3. The pressure rise due to 
combustion of one gram of agricultural dust will result in a dust being classified as 
explosible when no flame self-propagation occurred. 
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Table 3. Theoretical pressure rise in a 20-L chamber due to different ignition 
energies. 
Ignition 
Energy 
Dust 
Energy 
Temp 
(absolute) 
Pressure 
(absolute) 
Pressure 
(gauge) 
kJ kJ deg K Bar Bar 
2.5 
0 400 1.4 0.4 
16 1080 3.5 2.5 
5.0 
0 510 1.7 0.7 
16 1190 3.9 2.9 
10 
0 722 2.4 1.4 
16 1400 4.5 3.5 
 
 
An energy content of 16 kJ per gram, similar to many organic dusts, was used for 
the calculations for table 3, while the energy of carbon is approximately 32 kJ per gram. 
The energy content of a dust is critical because the more energy that is released in the 
combustion reaction, the higher the temperature and pressure rise will be. The calculated 
pressure rise would be even greater if the energy content of the dust was 32 kJ instead of 
16kJ. 
The results shown in table 3 are the theoretical values from a combustion 
reaction, with no requirement for the flame to self-propagate through the dust cloud. The 
pressure rise due to combustion of dust can be determined by subtracting the pressure 
rise due to the igniter alone. The pressure rise due to combustion of 1 gram of 
agricultural dust in a 20-L chamber is approximately 2 bars gauge, independent of the 
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size of igniter used. The criterion to determine if a dust is explosible in the ASTM 
method is a pressure rise of 1 bar gauge. Theoretical calculations show that combustion 
of 1 gram of agricultural dust in the 20-L chamber will result in a dust being classified as 
an explosible dust without a self-propagating flame. Forcing a flame through a dust 
cloud can result in a pressure rise above 1 bar gauge without a dust explosion occurring. 
Use of a high energy pyrotechnic chemical ignition sources may result in the combustion 
of the dust cloud without a self-propagating flame.  
Several flaws have been identified with the ASTM test method. The use of 
pressure as the only criterion does not ensure a dust explosion occurred, and the effects 
of the igniter in a 20-L chamber with no dust present will produce a pressure rise of over 
1 bar gauge, resulting in incorrect classification of a dust. The analysis of the procedures 
used by SCE revealed that values of 0.4 and 0.5 bars were being used as indicators to 
determine if a dust explosion had occurred. The change in the criterion by the testing 
laboratory demonstrates that the ASTM protocols are not clearly written and are being 
misinterpreted. The use of relatively high energy pyrotechnic energy sources does not 
ensure the flame self-propagates through the ASTM test chamber. 
GD was tested for dust explosibility by SCE and CAAQES personnel. An ash 
content of 87 percent was an indicator that flame self-propagation would not occur 
(Palmer, 1973). SCE reported not flame self-propagation in the screening testing 
performed in the 1.2-L chamber, but still reported GD was an explosible dust. No flame 
self-propagation was detected in the CAAQES testing. A flame was detected on the 
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stationary ignition source in CAAQES testing, demonstrating that the energy of the 
igniter was above the ignition energy of GD. 
 
Conclusions 
 
There are many flaws associated with the ASTM test method. The use of high 
ignition energy will result in an overdriven test. A dust must have a MEC to be an 
explosible dust. The use of pressure rise as the only criterion does not ensure a dust 
explosion occurred. Limited oxygen is available for reaction in the 20-L ASTM 
chamber. A non-explosible dust may be incorrectly classified as an explosible dust when 
utilizing the ASTM test method. The CAAQES test method mimics a primary dust 
explosion in facilities, such as grain elevators. The use of three criterion with the 
CAAQES test method ensure a dust explosion occurred. Utilizing the CAAQES test 
method, a more accurate dust explosibility classification can be made. Gin dust was 
determined to be non-explosible because no MEC exists. 
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CHAPTER III  
A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS TO DETERMINE IF A MEC OCCURS IN A 
COTTON GIN 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Prevention of primary dust explosions in facilities will result in the prevention of 
all dust explosions. Primary dust explosions occur in contained areas of a process stream 
where a MEC of explosible dust is present. Cornstarch has a MEC of 40 g/m
3
, which is 
typical of many agricultural dusts. The process stream of the facility handling the dust 
can be analyzed to determine locations at which MECs can occur. The process stream 
can be designed with control measures to prevent all the requirements of a dust 
explosion from occurring. The control measures will depend on the process stream and 
operating conditions. The concentration of dust can be reduced by ventilation or the 
addition of mineral oils to prevent a MEC from occurring (Parnell, 1993). Inert gasses 
can be used to reduce the amount of oxygen present. The potential ignition sources in 
this area can be reduced and preventive maintenance in these areas can be made a 
priority to reduce the probability of a dust explosion occurring. 
To determine if MECs are present in cotton gins, the different stages of the 
ginning process must be analyzed. The gin receives seed cotton, which is composed of 
cotton lint, cotton seed and trash. The gin removes the trash as well as separates the lint 
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from the seed. The process stream of a cotton gin can be approximated as an unloading 
system, first stage dryer/cleaner, second stage dryer/cleaner, gin stand, and the lint 
cleaner. A pneumatic conveying system is used to transport the cotton from one process 
to the next inside a cotton gin. It is assumed that if a MEC exists it will occur at a point 
in the pneumatic conveying system where the trash is separated from the lint and seed 
and at intersections of the process streams. For picked cotton, there is an average of 230 
kg (500 lbs) of lint, 360 kg (800 lbs) of seed, and 90 kg (200 lbs) of trash per bale. This 
results in a mass of 680 kg (1,500 lbs) of seed cotton per bale entering the gin. A worst 
case scenario of stripped cotton being ginned through the same gin was also evaluated. 
For stripped cotton, the average amount of lint and seed is similar to picked cotton. 
However, stripped cotton can have as much as 454 kg (1,000 lbs) of trash per bale. 
 
Methodology 
 
A hypothetical gin operating at standard temperature and pressure was used to 
determine if a MEC occurs in a cotton gin. A cotton gin was approximated using values 
given by the Texas A&M Endowed Cotton Chair (Parnell, 2010). A flow rate of 1.9 
cubic meters of air per kg (30 cubic feet of air per pound) of material was used as an 
estimate of the minimum volume-rate-of-flow (VRF) to convey the material through the 
pneumatic system of the cotton gin. As the seed cotton moves through the process 
streams, the mass of material is being reduced by the removal of trash and seed. Due to 
the removal process, the mass being conveyed will be reduced, resulting in a lower flow 
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rate of material through the remainder of the process stream. It was assumed that the 
seed cotton entered the gin at 680 kg (1500 lbs) per bale (M1) and the first stage 
dryer/cleaner removed 34 kg (75 lbs) of trash; therefore reducing the mass conveyed to 
the second stage dryer/cleaner to 646 kg (1425 lbs) per bale (M2). The second stage 
dryer/cleaner was assumed to remove the same amount of trash as the first stage, 
reducing the total mass to 610 kg (1350 lbs) per bale (M3) being conveyed to the gin 
stand. The gin stand separated the seed from the lint, resulting in 250 kg (550 lbs) per 
bale (M4) being conveyed to the lint cleaner. The lint cleaner removes the remaining 23 
kg (50 lbs) of trash per bale. It was assumed that same percentage of trash was removed 
by each part of the process stream in the worst case scenario. 
The first examination will be of the pneumatic conveying system that transports 
the seed cotton through the ginning process. There are only negligible losses from the 
unloading process to the first stage of the dryer/cleaner, so the mass and flow rate of 
seed cotton through this portion of the process stream will be considered the same as the 
rate of seed cotton entering the gin. The air needed for any stage of the pneumatic 
conveying system (Qi) for picked cotton can be calculated as shown in equation 6: 
 
60
1
*** VRFMGRQ iji        (6) 
where, Qi – Conveying Air Flow Rate (m
3
/min) 
GRj – Ginning Rate (bales/hour), GR1=20, GR2=40, GR3=60 
 Mi – mass of material in process stream (g/bale) 
 VRF – Volume-Rate-of-Flow (m3/kg.), 1.9 
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For a ginning rate (GR) of 20 bales per hour (bph) the estimated air flow from 
the unloading system to the first stage dryer/cleaner, Q1, was 420 cubic meters (15,000 
cubic feet) per minute. The mass flow rate (MFR) of the seed cotton can be calculated as 
shown in equation 7. 
60
1
** ij MGRMFR        (7) 
where, MFR – Mass Flow Rate (g/min) 
GRj – Ginning Rate (bales/hour), GR1=20, GR2=40, GR3=60 
 Mi – mass of material in process stream (g/bale) 
  
The MFR of the seed cotton from unloading to the first stage dryer/cleaner is 
estimated at 227,000 grams per minute, for a GR of 20 bales per hour. The MFR of 
cotton can be divided by the conveying air flow rate, as shown in equation 8, to result in 
the concentration of mass in the process stream. The result for the same part of the 
process stream results in a mass of 530 grams of cotton being conveyed per cubic meter 
of conveying air. Since the aerodynamic equivalent diameter (AED) for the seed and lint 
is much higher than 125 µm, most of the 530 g/m
3
 is not capable of fueling a dust 
explosion (Parnell, 2010).  
 
 
 
 
 34 
 
i
j
i Q
GREF
Q
MFR
Conc
1
*
60
1
**
1
1
*

     (8) 
where, Conc – Concentration of mass conveyed to conveying mass (g/m3) 
 MFR – Mass Flow Rate (g/min) 
 Qi – Conveying Air Flow Rate (m
3
/min) 
EF – Allowable Emission Factor (grams/bale) 
  – Efficiency of cyclone (decimal percent) 
 GRj – Ginning Rate (bales/hour), GR1=20, GR2=40, GR3=60 
The ratio of trash in the process stream can be calculated by removing the 590 kg 
(1300 lbs) of seed and lint from the mass used in equation 7. There are approximately 71 
grams of trash per cubic meter of conveying air from the unloading system to the first 
stage dryer/cleaner. However, tests conducted by Wang et al. (2004) determined that 
approximately only 5.5 percent of gin trash was fine dust. This results in the further 
reduction of the mass used in equation 7 to 0.055 times the 90 kg (200 lbs) of trash, 
resulting in a mass of 5 kg (11 lbs) per bale of fine dust in the conveying system from 
the unloading area to the first stage dryer/cleaner and a mass ratio of 4 grams of fine dust 
per cubic meter of conveying air. The remainder of the process stream was broken down 
as described above. 
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Results and Discussion 
 
The concentrations for the different sections of the process stream were 
calculated as explained above using equations 6 and 7, and the results are shown in table 
4. As seen in table 4, the highest mass ratio of fine dust to conveying air occurring in the 
pneumatic conveying system is approximately 4 g/m
3
, not taking into account the 
presence of the particles larger than 125 µm that would act as inhibitors to a dust 
explosion. It should be noted that at no time did the concentration reach 40 g/m
3
, which 
is the MEC for many agricultural dusts.  
The concentrations for the worst case scenario were then calculated with the 
results shown in table 5. With 5 times the amount of trash present in the process stream 
the maximum concentration is 13 g/m
3
. It would not be possible for a MEC to exist in a 
cotton gin even if the MEC of GD was 40g/m
3
. However, the MEC of GD was 
determined to be much higher. 
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Table 4. Results for calculations of concentrations of GD in cotton gins. 
Process 
Stream 
Gin 
Size 
Flow 
Rate of 
Air (Qi) 
Concentration 
of Total Mass 
Conveyed  
Concentration 
of Trash 
Concentration 
of GD 
 bph m
3
/min g/m
3
 g/m
3
 g/m
3
 
Unloading 
System to 1st 
Stage 
Dryer/Cleaner 
20 420 530 71 4 
40 850 530 71 4 
60 1,300 530 71 4 
1
st
 Stage 
Dryer/Cleaner 
to 2
nd
 Stage 
Dryer/Cleaner 
20 400 530 47 3 
40 800 530 47 3 
60 1,200 530 47 3 
2
nd
 Stage 
Dryer/Cleaner 
to Gin Stand 
20 380 534 20 1 
40 760 534 20 1 
60 1140 534 20 1 
Gin Stand to 
Lint Cleaner 
20 150 534 49 3 
40 300 534 49 3 
60 450 534 49 3 
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Table 5. Results for calculations of worst case scenario of concentrations of GD in 
cotton gins. 
Process 
Stream 
Gin 
Size 
Concentration 
of GD 
 bph g/m
3
 
Unloading 
System to 1st 
Stage 
Dryer/Cleaner 
20 13 
40 13 
60 13 
1
st
 Stage 
Dryer/Cleaner 
to 2
nd
 Stage 
Dryer/Cleaner 
20 10 
40 10 
60 10 
2
nd
 Stage 
Dryer/Cleaner 
to Gin Stand 
20 5 
40 5 
60 5 
Gin Stand to 
Lint Cleaner 
20 10 
40 10 
60 10 
 
Since the large particles act as inhibitors to a dust explosion, the abatement 
system, which is used to remove the fine dust from the air stream, was analyzed. The 
total emission factor (EF) for a cotton gin ginning picker cotton is 0.66 kg (1.4 lbs) per 
bale (EPA, 1995). Using a conservative cyclone efficiency of 90 percent, there would be 
6,600 g (14 lbs) per bale of particulate matter (PM) being transported from the 
pneumatic conveying system to the cyclones (Parnell, 2010). Using equation 8, the mass 
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of PM being conveyed through the system per mass of conveying air was calculated and 
is shown in table 6 for a ginning rate of 20, 40, and 60 bph. 
The air velocity calculated for the unloading to first stage dryer/cleaner was used 
in the calculation of the concentrations being transported to the cyclones. 
 
 
Table 6. GD concentrations in abatement system of cotton gin. 
Gin Size Concentration of GD 
bph g/m
3
 
20 5 
40 5 
60 5 
 
 
The concentration does not change with a change in the ginning rate as expected 
because the increase in PM brought into the gin is offset by the increased amount of air 
needed to convey it. The increased mass being conveyed in the worst case scenario 
results in more conveying air being used in the abatement system, resulting in a decrease 
in the concentrations of GD in the abatement system. The concentration in the abatement 
system for all three sizes of gins in the worst case scenario was 5 g/m
3
. 
 
 
 
 39 
 
Conclusions 
 
The presence of larger particles in the process stream of cotton gins would act as 
inhibitors to a dust explosion. Testing was conducted on GD at concentrations up to 
1,000 g/m
3
 by CAAQES personnel with no MEC being determined. The concentrations 
of GD found in a gin are less than 5 g/m
3
, therefore it is not possible for a dust explosion 
to occur in the pneumatic conveying system of a cotton gin. 
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CHAPTER IV  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Summary 
 
Recent dust explosions have demonstrated the importance of regulating 
explosible dusts to prevent dust explosions. In a comprehensive review of dust 
explosions, GD was identified as a suspect explosible dust. Testing was conducted 
utilizing the ASTM and CAAQES test methods. SCE personnel, utilizing the ASTM test 
method, reported GD was an explosible dust. However, personnel from the CAAQES 
laboratory utilized the CAAQES test method and reported that GD was a non-explosible 
dust. An analysis of the ASTM and CAAQES test methods was conducted to determine 
why utilizing the two test methods resulted in different classifications of GD. An 
explosible dust determination for GD was made. An analysis of the process stream in a 
cotton gin was also conducted to determine the locations in a cotton gin where a MEC 
may occur.  
 
Objective 1 
Several flaws were identified with the ASTM test method. The use of pressure as 
the only criterion, in a 20-L chamber, does not ensure a dust explosion has occurred. A 
pressure rise of over 1 bar gauge is possible due to the igniter alone. SCE used a 
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different ignition criterion than described in the ASTM protocols to determine if a dust 
explosion occurred, which suggests that the ASTM protocols are not clearly written or 
are being misinterpreted. It is assumed that the use of high energy igniters in testing GD 
in accordance with the ASTM test method resulted in an overdriven test. 
The analysis revealed that the three criterion utilized with CAAQES testing 
require a dust explosion to occur in order to classify a dust as an explosible dust. The 
presence of a flame in testing GD is evidence that GD is not a “hard to ignite” dust. The 
lack of flame self-propagation in tests up to 1,000 g/m
3
 utilizing the CAAQES test 
method as well as tests up to 17,000 g/m
3
 utilizing the 1.2-L vertical tube apparatus by 
SCE was used to determine that no concentration of GD will result in a dust explosion. 
 
Objective 2 
 The concentrations of GD in the process stream of a cotton gin were calculated to 
determine if it is possible for a MEC to occur. The use of air to convey material through 
the process stream reduces the concentrations of GD. The highest concentrations of GD 
in the process stream were found between the unloading system and the first stage 
dryer/cleaner. Analyzing gin sizes from 20, 40 and 60 bales per hour revealed that gin 
size does not affect the concentrations of GD due to the proportional increase of air used 
to convey the material through the process stream. The presence of larger particles in the 
process stream would act as inhibitors of flame self-propagation. The abatement system 
used to remove GD from the process stream was also analyzed for each of the three gin 
sizes. As expected the size of the gin did not affect the concentrations of GD found in 
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the abatement system. The highest concentration of GD calculated for any location in the 
cotton gin was 5 g/m
3
. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Objective 1 
 Gin dust is a non- explosible dust because it does not have an MEC. Gin dust 
should not be classified as an explosible dust.  
 OSHA should not regulate cotton gins for handling an explosible dust.  
 There are many flaws associated with the ASTM test method. The use of high 
energy ignition sources and pressure as the only criterion for a dust explosion can 
result in non-explosible dusts being classified as explosible dusts. There is a 
potential for a test to be overdriven when utilizing the ASTM test method. The 
ASTM test methods are not clearly written and may be misinterpreted. 
 
Objective 2 
 A MEC cannot occur in a cotton gin. The highest calculated concentration for 
GD in the process stream of a cotton gin was 5 g/m
3
. 
 The concentration of dust found in the process stream of a cotton gin is 
independent of the size of the cotton gin. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Tables 
 
 
Table 7. Results for CAAQES testing of Cornstarch. 
Sample Concentration 
(g/m
3
) 
Sample Size 
(g) 
Deflagration? 
(Y/N) 
CS 135_1 135 0.40 Y 
CS 135_2 135 0.40 Y 
CS 135_3 135 0.40 Y 
CS 100_1 100 0.30 Y 
CS 100_2 100 0.30 Y 
CS 100_3 100 0.30 Y 
CS 77_1 77 0.23 Y 
CS 77_2 77 0.23 Y 
CS 77_3 77 0.23 Y 
CS 57_1 57 0.17 Y 
CS 57_2 58 0.17 Y 
CS 57_3 57 0.17 Y 
CS 43_1 43 0.13 N 
CS 43_2 43 0.13 N 
CS 43_3 43 0.13 Y 
CS 40_1 40 0.12 N 
CS 40_2 40 0.12 N 
CS 40_3 40 0.12 N 
CS 37_1 37 0.11 N 
CS 37_2 37 0.11 N 
CS 37_3 37 0.11 N 
CS 33_1 33 0.10 N 
CS 33_2 33 0.10 N 
CS 33_3 33 0.10 N 
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Table 8. Results for CAAQES testing of Gin Dust. 
Sample 
Concentration 
(g/m
3
) 
Sample Size 
(g) 
Deflagration? 
(Y/N) 
GD 730_1 730 2.20 N 
GD 730_2 730 2.20 N 
GD 730_3 730 2.20 N 
GD 660_1 660 1.98 N 
GD 660_2 660 1.98 N 
GD 660_3 660 1.98 N 
GD 585_1 585 1.76 N 
GD 585_2 585 1.76 N 
GD 585_3 585 1.76 N 
GD 515_1 515 1.54 N 
GD 515_2 515 1.54 N 
GD 515_3 515 1.54 N 
GD 440_1 440 1.32 N 
GD 440_2 440 1.32 N 
GD 440_3 440 1.32 N 
GD 370_1 370 1.10 N 
GD 370_2 370 1.10 N 
GD 370_3 370 1.10 N 
GD 295_1 295 0.88 N 
GD 295_2 295 0.88 N 
GD 295_3 295 0.88 N 
GD 220_1 220 0.66 N 
GD 220_2 220 0.66 N 
GD 220_3 220 0.66 N 
GD 150_1 150 0.44 N 
GD 150_2 150 0.44 N 
GD 150_3 150 0.44 N 
GD 73_1 73 0.22 N 
GD 73_2 73 0.22 N 
GD 73_3 73 0.22 N 
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Table 9. Results for CAAQES testing of Dust XX. 
Sample Concentration 
(g/m
3
) 
Sample 
Size 
(g) 
Deflagration? 
(Y/N) 
XX 93_1 93 0.28 Y 
XX 93_2 93 0.28 Y 
XX 93_3 93 0.28 Y 
XX 77_1 77 0.23 N 
XX 77_2 77 0.23 Y 
XX 77_3 77 0.23 Y 
XX 73_1 73 0.22 N 
XX 73_2 73 0.22 Y 
XX 73_3 73 0.22 N 
XX 70_1 70 0.21 N 
XX 70_2 70 0.21 N 
XX 70_3 70 0.21 N 
XX 67_1 67 0.20 N 
XX 67_2 67 0.20 N 
XX 67_3 67 0.20 N 
 
